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Abstract 
 
Is trade policy a surrogate for a non-existent European Union (EU) foreign policy?  Is it a central 
element in a more or less coherent European foreign policy?  These questions expose a basic 
tension between the views of trade purists and foreign policy specialists, both academic and 
practitioner.  For purists, EU foreign policy objectives intrude, as they should not, on trade policy.  
For foreign policy specialists, trade is the principal European foreign policy tool and what makes 
it a ‘civilian power’.  This paper challenges both views as part of an investigation into Europe’s 
capacity for ‘strategic action’ – coordinated action in the pursuit of defined goals – in trade 
policy, but also more generally. It argues that EU trade policy remains a primary vehicle for the 
expression of collective European power, but that it is a highly contested, rules-bound, and 
atomized arena of policy.  The EU occasionally acts strategically in trade policy, but rarely across 
policy sectors.  There is little evidence to sustain the arguments that EU trade policy is closely 
coordinated with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, that it acts as a surrogate for it, or 
that the EU deploys a ‘structural foreign policy’.   
 
 
  1Academic interest in the European Union (EU) as a global actor is probably at an all-time 
high, and for good reason.  There is no question that the EU is more active in more areas 
of external policy, including many beyond its traditional policy space of economic 
diplomacy, than it ever has been (see Peterson 2008).  It is difficult to find any area of 
foreign policy – itself a growth area in the study of international relations (IR) (Hill 2003) 
– where the EU does not now play a role.   
Second, the rise of a new security agenda engendered by the US-led ‘war on 
terrorism’ has acted to obscure upsurges in interest and research over several decades on 
international political economy in the study of IR.  Here, the EU is both a model for other 
regions and an undisputed international superpower.  Above all, it is the EU’s power to 
regulate its huge market of nearly 500 million consumers – nearly 40 per cent more than 
the United States’ – that makes it powerful internationally.  The Union is long past the 
point of having any exclusively ‘internal policies’, since nearly every move it makes has 
powerful ripple effects on stakeholders beyond Europe’s own borders.   
Third, Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated how a hegemon can win wars and then 
‘lose the peace’ in the new security environment, and meanwhile bolstered the status of 
‘soft power’ has been bolstered as one of the big ideas of our times.  One effect is to 
rekindle interest in the idea of the EU as a ‘civilian power’.  That is, a Union with an 
active foreign policy that favours persuasion over coercion, or at least resorts to coercion 
– when there is no alternative to it – using non-military (especially economic) 
instruments (Whitman 1998; Obie 2006).   
The EU now has a lengthy track record of using economic policy instruments –
economic sanctions, development policy, various mechanisms for promoting regional 
cooperation – to pursue what could only be called foreign policy goals, including 
security, development, human rights, and environmental protection.  Perhaps above all, it 
has its Common Commercial Policy (CCP), as specified in Article 133 of the Treaty but 
recently much enhanced (see below).   
It is now almost 10 years since Michael Smith (1998) was (at least one of the) first to 
argue that the EU was capable of strategic action:  coordinated activities across different 
policy sectors in the pursuit of defined foreign policy goals.  At the time, not only was the 
(then) fledgling Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) not the most important 
  2instrument of the EU’s foreign policy.  The main fount of strategic action was, it was 
claimed, the Union’s ability to wield its economic power.   
Since then, the EU has tried to prove its critics, who are frequently American and 
chide the Union for its international weakness,
1 wrong by agreeing a European Security 
Strategy (ESS).  The ESS is the closest thing the Union has ever had to a foreign policy 
doctrine.  It is vague, aspirational, and self-congratulatory (see Heisbourg 2004; 
Dannreuther and Peterson 2006).  Still, the ESS is seen by its defenders as a statement of 
how the EU’s soft power – including that which flows from its status as a major trade 
power – can be deployed in the pursuit of strategic objectives (Biscop 2005; Biscop and 
Drieskens 2006).  In short, the EU is plenty active internationally and now has a 
‘strategy’.  Does that add up to a Union capable of strategic action?  Is it an effective 
civilian power?  Is trade policy now foreign policy? 
It helps, first, to be clear on terminology and views about how trade policy fits into 
the foreign policy mix.  In recent years, EU trade policy has taken on expanded meaning 
beyond the CCP as specified in its Treaties.  It has become as much (or more) about how 
the Union regulates its own market, as opposed to the traditional paraphernalia of tariffs 
or quotas (Young and Peterson 2007).  Meanwhile, the CCP itself has been considerably 
enhanced.  Consider ‘conditionality’, or the linking of trade privileges with specific 
conditions that must be met by 3
rd countries, which is now a required feature of all EU 
external agreements.  Thus, the Union increasingly ties its own hands and finds it difficult 
to maintain its traditional disinclination to punish states that violate the terms of their 
agreements with the EU (see Gillespie and Youngs 2002; Youngs 2004).  The expansion 
of EU trade policy means that it dovetails with the still more expansive notion of 
‘European foreign policy’, a term which features increasingly in the literature as a 
shorthand term for the full universe of all foreign policy actions undertaken by the EU 
and its member states (see Hill 2004).   
Still, we find very different views about both the actual and preferred nexus trade and 
foreign policy.  Specifically, a basic tension exists between the views of trade purists, be 
they liberal economists or trade policy-makers, and foreign policy specialists, whether 
they are diplomats or academics.  For purists, EU foreign policy objectives intrude, as 
they should not, on trade policy, which should be used narrowly to defend European 
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which the EU conducts a ‘structural’ foreign policy (Keukelaire 2001; 2003; 2004) – 
which seeks to shape the structure of international society – and allows the Union to act 
as a ‘civilian power’, which uses non-military, mostly economic power in pursuit of its 
foreign policy objectives.   
This paper challenges both views as part of an investigation into Europe’s capacity 
for ‘strategic action’ – coordinated action in the pursuit of defined goals – in trade policy, 
but also more generally. It argues that EU trade policy remains a primary vehicle for the 
expression of collective European power, but that it is a highly contested, rules-bound, 
and atomized arena of policy.  The EU occasionally acts strategically in trade policy, but 
rarely across policy sectors.  There is little evidence to sustain the arguments that EU 
trade policy is closely coordinated with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, or that 
it acts as a surrogate for it.  EU trade policy – not surprisingly – is used above all to 
defend European economic interests or competitive advantage, as opposed to any grander 
European vision of the world order that might guide a structural foreign policy.  Strategic 
action is all about coordination of institutions, actors, and policy tools.  Even if the EU is 
getting better at thinking strategically, it still lacks much capacity for coordination of its 
actions.  As such, recent scholarship on European foreign policy – in which 
constructivism has become a dominant perspective – tends to give the EU rather more 
credit than it deserves for being a coherent, effective, civilian power. 
 
1.  Trade policy as foreign policy 
Perhaps the leading exponent of the purist view that EU trade policy acts (undesirably) as 
a surrogate for European foreign policy is Patrick Messerlin.  A liberal economist rather 
than a foreign policy specialist, Messerlin makes the argument most explicitly in a 400 
plus page tome entitled Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe, one in a series of 
studies of the costs of protection a variety of countries and regions in the world 
(Messerlin 2001).  Messerlin’s study is thorough and diligently researched, even if it 
employs rather controversial methods to come up with the conclusion that protectionism 
costs Europe something like the annual economic output of Spain.
2   
  4  Yet, the EU’s protective shield can be bargained away, according to this account, 
for strategic advantage.  Messerlin (2001:  197-248) devotes a long section of his study to 
the (at the time) nearly 100 preferential trade agreements (PTAs; sometimes called FTAs 
for free trade agreements) the European Union had negotiated with third states or other 
regional organizations.  He argues that the Union uses trade policy as an instrument of its 
collective power and essentially as a surrogate for foreign policy ‘because the EU has no 
other way (foreign policy or army) to express its political views’ (Messerlin 2001: 1).   
More specifically, Messerlin’s argument seems to be that ‘the EU’s penchant for 
PTAs can be understood within the context of a power struggle between the US and EU 
for leadership in the multilateral system’ (Van Den Hoven 2004: 222).  At first glance, 
the claim seems curious given that the US had (again, at the time) agreed only three 
regional PTAs.  Still, the claim is clear:  the EU uses one of the only potent policy 
weapons it has to try to isolate the US, specifically by trading access to the European 
market for political support from developing countries.  More generally, ‘[i]ts high 
political content has made E[U] trade policy an obvious substitute for foreign policy, to 
an extent unseen in other industrial countries’ (see Messerlin 2001:4). 
Interestingly, one recent account makes a diametrically opposite argument.  That 
is:  the Union entirely fails to use its economic power at the service of its foreign policy 
agenda, which has been sold out as Europe has acquiesced to American hegemony 
(Cafruny and Ryner 2003).  This account recalls a barely remembered 1980s debate about 
whether the creation of the single market would harm non-EU producers, and laments 
that if there was ever a ‘Fortress Europe’ agenda to challenge American supremacy, ‘the 
project is now in ruin…the EU…is being subordinated into a much larger neoliberal, 
transnational, structural, and institutional ensemble under American leadership’ (Cafruny 
and Ryner 2003: vii).  According to this view, ‘EU states lack the commitment required 
to fulfill their nominal ambitions, even in the European space itself, to a security order 
underpinned by cosmopolitan human rights norms and international law’ (Cafruny 2003: 
96).   
Such polar opposite readings might make our heads spin.  Alternatively, they 
might induce us to seek evidence across the EU’s institutional and policy systems to help 
us navigate the debate.  Specifically, we might examine the content of the EU’s trade 
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geopolitical ambitions or strategic vision of foreign policy.  What is the evidence that 
trade policy is used as foreign policy?   
One hard, undeniable fact is that the EU is a world leader in preferential trade 
agreements.  It has ‘notified’ considerably more PTAs to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) than any other WTO member.  Whether or not such hyperactivity constitutes 
‘strategic action’ (see section 2 below), in harmony with the CFSP or not, there is plenty 
of EU trade policy activity on which to base a judgement.   
It is also clear that the European Commission, whose position within the CCP is 
stronger than it is in any other area of external policy, sees PTAs as instruments that 
should be used strategically (see Baldwin 2006).  The evidence is on display in, say, the 
Commission’s contribution to the 2006 debate on the place of trade policy in the EU’s 
wider ‘growth and jobs strategy’, a designated touchstone for all EU policies under the 
Commission President of José Manuel Barroso.  The Commission’s working document 
on Global Europe:  Competing in the World notes that the EU’s development and 
‘neighbourhood’ policies – the latter designed to promote stability and growth in states 
on the EU’s borders - (see Dannreuther 2004) have been well-served by PTAs.  Yet, 
somewhat bizarrely, it also asserts that the EU’s ‘main trade interests….are less well 
served’.  The message appears to be:  we should continue to use trade policy as foreign 
policy, but we need to use trade policy more as trade policy: 
 
We should continue to factor other issues and the wider role of trade policy in EU 
external relations into bilateral trade developments. But in order for trade policy 
to help create jobs and drive growth, economic factors must play a primary role in 
the choice of future FTAs.
3
 
Impressionistically, the statement hints at a classic inter-Commission turf battle, with part 
of the Commission – logically, DG Trade – using the ‘jobs and growth’ mantra to shoo 
other parts (DG Development?  Relex?  Enlargement?) off their policy patch.  We might 
consider it prime facie evidence of the use of EU trade policy as foreign policy.  
  6Moreover, there are other reasons to think that the EU may be becoming more 
single-minded and strategic in trade policy.  Take, for example, the way in which its older 
member states rallied around tough positions in negotiations with the new EU states that 
joined in the 2004-7 enlargements.  As part of those negotiations, various new members – 
including Hungary and Slovenia - sought special treatment or transition periods to 
accommodate their dependence on trade with former Soviet bloc states.  But the Union 
refused to grant special concessions, and thus the new 10 (eventually 12) were essentially 
obliged to withdraw entirely with any bilateral agreements not in conformity with EU 
trade legislation (Van Den Hoven 2004: 215) 
The EU’s capacity for strategic action may recently have expanded as a 
consequence of European trade policy becoming broadly, more pro-liberalisation in an 
enlarged Union.  The upshot is that the EU may be more willing than before to bargain 
away its protective shield for geopolitical gain.  Here, the early behaviour of the 10 states 
that joined in 2004 (the jury is still out on Bulgaria and Romania) led to suggestions that 
enlargement made the Union more prone to measures to open its markets, especially for 
industrial imports, perhaps because the new 10 all had been subject to the vagaries of the 
EU’s anti-trade defences in the past (see Van Den Hoven 2004: 216).    
Relatedly, it might be hypothesised that the Commission has been empowered by 
enlargement generally, but more specifically in trade policy.  The CCP may be harder for 
trade ministers to control in a Union of 25/7, and the Commission’s ‘first mover’ 
advantage may be enhanced.  Traditionally, the Commission has usually been viewed as 
more pro-liberalization than the median intergovernmental position on the Council, 
perhaps not least because a broadly liberal stance is most compatible with EU trade 
policy activism.  The Commission may now have more allies who share its liberal agenda 
in an EU-27.    
Finally, we can look to the EU’s ultimate statement of how strategy and action 
should intersect:  the 2003 European Security Strategy.
4  A much-remarked upon final 
section of the document (just before its conclusion) speaks of the need for the EU to 
develop a ‘strategic culture’ and become ‘more active, more coherent, and more capable’.  
It urges that the EU must be more active in pursuing its ‘strategic objectives’, and use all 
instruments available, including trade policy.  Specifically referring to the EU’s goal of 
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development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda.  In a 
crisis there is no substitute for unity of command’. 
Leaving aside ‘crises’ (when trade policy surely has low utility), the question of 
whether the EU has the ‘unity of command’ needed to pursue strategic action using trade 
policy remains an open one.  But the question is not the classic ‘who speaks for Europe’ 
question (see Allen 1998; Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999).  Since trade policy is such a 
‘big’ and relatively self-contained policy area, the question is: who coordinates it with a 
wider European foreign policy agenda?  We need to answer this question first and before 
we can answer the more primordial question of whether the EU is capable of strategic use 
of trade policy in the service of its wider foreign policy agenda. 
 
2.   Who coordinates for Europe?   
It is many years ago now that Peter Ludlow (1992) argued that politics in the EU system 
were played out mostly in the form of inter- and intra-institutional competition.  The 
point applies acutely to external policy.  As such, it is astonishing that the great 
unanswered question of European foreign policy – who is in charge? – seemed to have 
been answered a few years ago by the Constitutional Treaty.  It is now easy to forget how 
long the debate about giving the EU’s partners one, Kissinger-esque ‘phone number to 
call’ went on, and how many twists and turns it took.  What is perhaps most remarkable 
is how once audacious proposals ended up being embraced after Europe’s excruciating 
divisions over Iraq.  Consider the Commission’s (2002) proposal under the Presidency of 
Romano Prodi that ‘the centre of gravity for policy initiative in the CFSP should lie with 
the Commission’ (Dassù and Missiroli 2002: 83).  What only years before would have 
been an outrageous suggestion was essentially embraced in the provisions of the 2004 
Constitutional Treaty for a new EU Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA).  Not only would 
the MFA be a Vice-President of the Commission as well as chair of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers.  A new, integrated External Action Service, combining EU and 
national officials, staffing what would start to look like real ‘EU embassies’, would work 
under their authority.  
  8The EU will probably get its Minister of Foreign Affairs some day.  But until the 
question is resolved of what to do with the Constitutional Treaty, following its 2005 
rejection in referenda held in France and the Netherlands, the Union will need to get by 
with its existing, confusing formula whereby it is represented externally by a ‘troika’.  It 
consists of the External Relations Commissioner, the High Representative for the CFSP, 
and the Foreign Minister of the state holding the Council’s rotating Presidency.   
Note that the troika does not include the Commissioner for External Trade.  Note 
also that there is no suggestion that the MFA would have prerogative over EU trade 
policy.  These results are unsurprising in view of how ‘big’, complex, and challenging to 
manage is the EU’s trade policy portfolio, which governs access to a market of nearly 
500 million.  Trade policy is also highly self-contained and rarefied policy realm, not 
least because the competence that is delegated to the EU in trade policy is unusually 
‘hard’:  article 133 gives it exclusive authority (over cross-border trade in goods and 
services), decision-making is by qualified majority voting (QMV), and the European 
Parliament has virtually no formal power.
5  The EU Trade Commissioner is thus 
massively more powerful, relative to his or her colleagues in the College of 
Commissioners, than are trade ministers within national governments.  Presiding over the 
levers of access to the massive EU market makes the Trade Commissioner very powerful 
more generally, probably more powerful than all but a handful of the EU’s diverse 
collection of Prime Ministers.   
The trauma of Iraq may have convinced the equivalent of a winning coalition in 
the Convention on the Future of Europe and, then, the intergovernmental conference 
(IGC) that ‘finalised’ the Constitutional Treaty, to give the MFA strong prerogatives to 
speak for the EU in foreign policy.  But the Prodi Commission’s (early) suggestion that a 
single senior Commissioner – who would later morph into the MFA – would take on the 
merged and regrouped competencies of the present external relations, aid, and trade 
Commissioners was always a proposal too far (see Dassù and Missiroli 2002: 83).     
The point is that if EU trade policy is deployed as a tool of foreign policy, it must 
be – and will be far into the future - via the coordination of the separate activities and 
administrations of multiple different Commissioners.  This is to say nothing of the 
Council, or national foreign and trade ministries, or the European Council, which 
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to Nuttall (2005: 109) ‘will find that his/her appearances on the international stage 
constitute the only rewarding political activity, and that there is competition with the 
Foreign Minister [MFA] for the leading role’.  Even the European Parliament, with its 
new (as of the current parliament) Committee on International Trade (INTA), has become 
more engaged.  In short, even if the Constitutional Treaty were ratified tomorrow, the 
problems of coherence and consistency in European foreign policy would by no means 
disappear.    
What about the suggestion, introduced earlier, that the EU acts with sufficient 
coherence and consistency to use preferential trade agreements (PTA) to express its 
‘political views’?  When (and if) this happens, are the EU’s political views themselves 
coherent, consistent, and single-minded?  A first point to note is that the EU’s 
hyperactivity on the PTA front has varied over time.  A second is that just because it has 
agreed a large number of PTAs does not necessarily mean that it has used the lure of 
preferential trade agreements strategically.  In the 1990s, a period of peak activity, it was 
widely-agreed that the Commission pursued PTAs mostly haphazardly, with individual 
Commissioners using such agreements to make themselves – and therefore the EU – 
seem active and effective in specific geographical regions (see Peterson and Bomberg 
1999:  143-6).   
Since then, the pace has fallen off in the agreement of new PTAs with third states.  
The EU has embraced more complex, region-to-region agreements, involving trade as 
well as a rich variety of other EU policy instruments, with other regional organizations 
such as ASEAN and Mercosur.  Yet, it has relatively little to show for these efforts, other 
than a desire – which can look half-hearted when it conflicts with other objectives – to 
replicate European-style of regional cooperation in other parts of the word (see Smith, K. 
E. 2003).  Here, we might see potential, at least, for strategic action in the pursuit of an 
agreed policy objective:  promoting regionalism.  But the objective itself seems to be of a 
second order variety.  Achieving it involves very complex negotiations which the 
Commission has difficulty leading or coordinating. 
Perhaps impasse as a common feature of the EU’s region-to-region negotiations is 
a fleeting phenomenon, particularly in light of two anticipated changes arising from 
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thus willing to go to greater lengths to secure market-opening deals with other regions 
and states.  Second, the Commission is, on balance, empowered by enlargement and, 
logically, better able to use trade policy strategically. 
In fact, neither of these changes seems to have materialized in any clear-cut or 
consistent way.  Rather than changing the political balance between liberalizers and 
protectionists on the Council, enlargement seems to have resulted in little change to the 
status quo.  As fervently pro-market as some of the (especially northern) new member 
states are, the new 800 pound gorilla in the room when a proposal to liberalize is tabled is 
frequently Poland.  An important factor in determining Poland’s stance in the first years 
after its accession was the EU’s failure, from a Polish point of view, to stand up to Russia 
in a dispute which saw it block a variety of Polish agricultural imports.
6  More generally, 
as one insider put it, ‘the [new] 12 map on quite well to the [old] 15.  Sure, you have 
Estonia, but you also have Poland’.
7
  The argument that the Commission has been empowered in trade policy by 
enlargement is also hard to sustain.  For one thing, even reliably liberal, established, 
smaller EU member states have at times aggressively opposed proposals to liberalise that 
risked short-term economic pain in exchange for long-term gain:  the Netherlands was 
cited in this regard by several EU officials who expressed surprise at its repeated shows 
of trade policy conservatism after the 2005 Dutch referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty and before the 2007 Dutch general election.  For another, there was at least 
anecdotal evidence of large EU member states responding to enlargement by caucusing 
and coordinating more frequently with like-minded others:  France with other ‘club Med’ 
states, the UK with northern liberal states, Germany with states that supported its own 
agenda on particular dossiers, and so on.  It was difficult for the Commission to win 
policy arguments when any of these coalitions showed capacity for collective action in 
support of a position that differed from the Commission’s.   
More generally, there was a widely-shared sense within the Commission’s 
services that the Barroso Commission was more a follower than a leader in policy terms, 
including on trade policy.  The initiative of the 2007 Germany Presidency to strike a deal 
with the United States (US) on the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade was one 
  11example.  Here, the Council Presidency was arguably usurping a core competency of the 
Commission.  Yet, the only tangible outcome of this initiative (at the time of writing), the 
US-EU Open Skies deal, had been pursued by the Commission as a top priority for years.  
It was piloted to a successful conclusion by the Commission, with the EU clearly giving 
away more than it got in the negotiations, but only (in all likelihood) because a Council 
Presidency linked it to one of its own policy priorities.  Here, we find what looks very 
much like strategic action, with Germany under Angela Merkl making repair of the EU’s 
partnership with the US a priority of its 2007 Council Presidency.  Who coordinates?  In 
this case, it appears to be a particularly powerful Council Presidency.  
Nevertheless, when attempts are made to use trade policy as foreign policy, the 
Commission usually holds enough cards at least to act as a veto player.  In fact, the 
Commission is treated as the equivalent of a ‘government’ in many treatments of EU 
trade policy, whether the focus is specifically on transatlantic trade relations (Petersmann 
2001; Pollack and Shaffer 2001) or more general (Meunier 2005; Young 2007).  If the 
EU is to use trade policy strategically as an element of foreign policy, it must coordinate 
its activities across distinct institutions, policy sectors, actors, and even Commission 
portfolios.  Some of the most convincing treatments of European foreign policy insist on 
the special importance of institutions (Smith 2001; Smith, M. E. 2003; 2004), particularly 
as forums that facilitate the socialization of national and EU officials to the Union’s 
common cause(s) in specific areas of policy.  The question is whether they also facilitate 
coordination between EU external policies, such as those for trade and the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.  The section that follows considers this question.   
 
3.   Institutions matter:  stovepipes of excellence? 
The question of who coordinates for Europe in external policy inevitably overlaps with 
questions about how well the EU’s external policy institutions work, and particularly how 
well they work together.  It is perhaps ironic that the EU has developed such high 
ambitions in the policy area – foreign policy – where its institutions are widely held to be 
weakest.  Yet, it is also plausible to argue, as does the originator of the concept ‘strategic 
action’, that the CCP is central to European foreign policy and that institutions – which 
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M. 2004) 
  Specifically, what has become a formidable European institution in its own right – 
the Community method of decision-making, featuring QMV – applies to the CCP but not 
to most other areas of EU external policy.  Of course, extending QMV remains a matter 
of live debate.
8  Again, it is easy to forget how ripe it seemed for extension before the 
Constitutional Treaty’s popular rejection in 2005.  One of the most respected intellectuals 
amongst all EU practitioners, the Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, personally 
campaigned in 2002 for the extension of the Community method not only to all areas of 
trade policy (it does not apply ‘cleanly’ to all areas; see Messerlin 2001: 14), but to 
foreign policy as well.  This injunction often met with resistance, but was always couched 
in terms that suggested that trade policy was foreign policy, and vice versa.  For Lamy, 
trade policy was ‘not a stand-alone policy, it contributes to the achievement of the 
Union’s overall objectives...[such as] to promote sustainable development, or to respect 
and promote cultural diversity’.
9  Pointedly, Lamy reminded his audiences of the precise 
wording of the American counterpart of the European Security Strategy:  the 2002 US 
National Security Strategy.  ‘The only place in that document where reference is made to 
the “European Union” is on trade. For the rest, Europe, be it Old, New or “à point”, 
simply does not exist’.
10
  In the months just before and after the Iraq war began, a large majority of member 
states – including Germany, France, and the UK – signaled a willingness to accept more 
majority voting in foreign policy.  Subsequent backtracking, especially by Paris and 
London, led to proposals to make different types of foreign policy proposals subject to 
different voting rules:  any proposal from the new Minister of Foreign Affairs would be 
approved by some kind of ‘super majority’ under QMV while proposals from member 
states would require unanimous approval (see CER 2003: 4).  However, all such 
proposals fell by the wayside in the Convention and the IGC.  It is hard to imagine them 
being revived anytime soon.  The CFSP is likely to be made by unanimity – when it is 
‘made’ at all – far into the future. 
  In contrast, at least the ‘shadow’ of QMV hangs over EU trade policy.  No major 
trade agreement has ever been agreed without something approaching unanimity in the 
  13Council (enlargement may cause the EU to break this pattern).  Nevertheless, there is at 
least the potential to override the protests of one or more member states, even large ones, 
to agree trade deals that serve wider foreign policy interests.  A prime example is the so-
called ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) agreement offered to the world’s 49 least developed 
countries in 2001, giving them ostensibly unrestricted access to the EU’s market for all 
products except arms (see section 4 below).  Apparently a textbook example of the 
strategic use of EU trade policy, EBA was agreed over the objections of France with a 
French Trade Commissioner, Lamy, piloting the deal to conclusion.   
  Alternatively, there is capacity within EU trade policy for construction of the 
classic European ‘package deal’ to buy off one or more reluctant states, as an alternative 
to out-voting them.  One tactic is to find a way to channel some kind of EU side payment 
to a state that stands to be particularly disadvantaged by a proposed trade agreement.  The 
offer of EU subsidies for Portugal’s textiles industry in exchange for its acceptance of the 
Uruguay Round agreement is a frequently-cited example (see Devuyst 1995).  Here, 
along with the case of EBA, we find at least anecdotal evidence of the Community 
method facilitating action that might be seen as serving some higher European foreign 
policy purpose. 
  At the more mundane level of day-to-day policy, evidence of strategic action is 
considerably scarcer, or at least more ambiguous.  Usually, the Union seems motivated 
mainly by defense of its economic advantage or interests.  The EU’s activity is far more 
rules-bound than in other areas of foreign policy, since trade policy at this level is 
powerfully shaped by law and economics, as opposed to politics and power.  In a sense, 
EU member states do appear to act ‘strategically’ insofar as they go to lengths not to 
question each other’s trade complaints.  There is considerable log-rolling by EU member 
states both in the use of the Union’s trade defense mechanisms – its anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties provisions for fighting off import surges – and especially in the 
bringing of cases before the WTO.  In the case of anti-dumping, the EU has launched 
more investigations each year since 2003 and has emerged as the undisputed world leader 
in this area even as the global rate of anti-dumping investigations has fallen to all-time 
lows.
11  As for WTO cases, EU member states rarely oppose proposals to litigate that are 
  14tabled by their counterparts, perhaps on the logic that they may need support for litigating 
their own complaints in future rounds of bargaining.   
However, Young (2007) argues convincingly that the Commission is an effective 
gatekeeper, and that it tends towards caution in initiating WTO litigation.
12  It is rare to 
find the EU initiating complaints in response to trade deficits or as a form of retaliation.  
Here, it might be said that the EU appears to engage in strategic inaction:  it keeps 
disputes out of the WTO if it fears that resorting to litigation risks damaging its broader 
political relationships.   
  While EU trade policy is always negotiated and usually a product of compromise, 
the Commission’s institutional position is, again, strong and its autonomy considerable.  
Here as elsewhere, the institutions that have grown up ‘around’ other areas of EU 
external policy competence are (for the most part) rigidly demarcated and self-contained.  
Start with the High Representative, who is also the Council’s Secretary-General and has 
built up a formidable administration to defend the Council’s prerogative over the CFSP.  
The Commission retains little more than ‘invited guest’ status within the CFSP.  Yet, it 
has its own administration – DG Relex – for external relations, as well as separate 
directorates for trade, aid and development, and enlargement/neighbourhood policy.  It is 
difficult for non-EU specialists to fathom just how deeply-engrained is functional 
specialization or how ferocious is turf-battling is between different Brussels 
administrations (Lewis 2000; Howorth 2001; Egeberg 2005; Smith et al. 2007).  That the 
loyalties of functional administrations are often stronger to their own, narrowly-defined 
external policy sector than even to their EU institution, let alone whatever foreign policy 
aspirations on which 27 European states can agree, is hardly conducive to coherence and 
consistency in foreign policy (Nuttall 2005). 
  Even leaving aside the Constitutional Treaty’s proposed reforms, numerous 
institutional fixes have been attempted to facilitate exchange and coordination between 
different external policy administrations and agents.  Within the Commission itself, both 
the Santer and Barroso Commissions convened sub-groups of external policy 
Commissioners (for external relations, trade, aid, enlargement).  Yet, there is little 
evidence that they have functioned as more than forums for information-sharing (see 
Peterson 2006).   
  15More generally, can we find evidence of coordination between trade policy and 
the CFSP, despite the Commission’s position of relative strength in the former and 
weakness in the latter?  And do the difficulties of agreeing a CFSP by unanimity in a EU 
of 27 create stronger pressures for using trade policy as foreign policy?  One senior DG 
Trade official termed the latter proposition: 
 
Way too theoretical.  Where does the increased pressure come from, and on whom 
would it fall?  Are trade ministers under pressure from foreign ministers to do trade 
deals as there is no CFSP?  Does [High Representative for the CFSP Javier] Solana, 
gnashing his teeth in frustration, call up [Trade Commissioner Peter] Mandelson and 
tell him to get on with an FTA with Korea? I don't think so…Does our FTA with 
India show evidence of the EU's soft power strategic assertiveness vis-à-vis a US-
Pakistan axis?  Seems a reach.
13  
 
For his part, a US diplomat with abundant experience of Brussels policy-making 
quipped: 
 
I think the EU’s foreign policy bureaucracies have a lot in common with some of our 
more insular, independent regulatory agencies back in Washington.  They’re certainly 
competent in their defined areas of expertise but have very, very narrow views of the 
world.  It is like foreign policy made by a dozen Bundesbanks.  Stovepipes of 
excellence.
14     
 
4.  Strategic action:  policy examples 
Our analysis thus far suggests that Lamy’s claim that EU trade policy does not ‘stand 
alone’ and that it serves, potentially at least, the Union’s ‘overall objectives’ cannot be 
dismissed out of hand.  There is no question that, with sufficient unity of command and 
clarity of purpose, trade policy can be used by the EU either to coerce or reward, and 
with considerable impact even on its most powerful international interlocutors.  More 
specifically, three sources of ammunition in the form of specific policy examples are on 
offer to those who wish to portray trade policy as foreign policy.   
  16  The first is economic sanctions policy.  The recent case of Iran, which the Union 
moved to punish for failing to curtail its nuclear development programme, is an 
illustrative case in point.  The EU, acting primarily through its most powerful member 
states (the ‘EU-3’:  France, Germany and the UK), has been at the forefront of nuclear 
diplomacy with Iran, in a case where considerable strategic action appears to have been 
coordinated between policy areas and levels of government (Sauer 2007).   
Notably, however, the EU has ratcheted up economic pressure on Iran reluctantly 
and only under sustained pressure from the US.  Washington persistently grumbles, 
regardless of the political flavour of its current administration, about how slow and weak 
the Union’s economic sanctions tend to be.  In the specific case of Iran, the Bush 
administration has made no secret of its displeasure with European companies (especially 
French ones) that continue to work under large contracts in Iran.
15  There is no doubt that 
the EU has been slow to implement UN-approved sanctions, often citing the lack of legal 
tools its governments have to act against Iranian companies.
16   
Of course, Iran is only one example, and an unusually politicized one, of the use 
of EU sanctions.  It is possible to cite other examples, including recent ones such the 
withdrawal of trade privileges from Berlarus to protest its labour standards,
17 where 
slapping economic sanctions on a miscreant trading partner has had to hurt.  Yet, there is 
now a considerable literature that casts doubt on the efficacy of economic sanctions 
generally (Baldwin 1985; Elliott et al. 1990; Haas and O'Sullivan 2000).  Strangely, there 
seems to have been little systematic evaluation of the impact or efficacy of EU sanctions 
policy, as well as a tendency for European foreign policy specialists to assume (rather 
uncritically) that sanctions are an effective tool of the EU’s ‘carrot and stickism’ (see 
Manners 2002: 245)      
  A second policy example where trade policy seems to have yielded strategic 
action is ‘Everything But Arms’.  EBA’s effects still await rigorous investigation more 
than 5 years after it was agreed, with one analysis done for the Commission noting that 
‘only a small number of studies have relied on original measures and satisfactory data’ 
(Gallezot and Bureau 2005: 7).  But it was always clear that EBA would not be without 
problems and that it would probably divert as much trade as it created.  An early analysis 
noted that EBA threatened to work at cross-purposes with the EU’s stated goals of 
  17promoting regional cooperation and ensuring reciprocity in its trade relations (since it 
unilaterally abrogated existing agreements) (see Page and Hewitt 2002).   
The Commission study noted above suggests that EBA has had an impact thus far 
in only a few economic sectors (such as sugar) and that its benefits for poor countries are 
likely to be eroded over time (see Gallezot and Bureau 2005).  The same analysis broadly 
concurs with the view that EBA was driven by ‘essentially political, not developmental, 
motives’ (Page and Hewitt 2002: 91).  Specifically, EBA seems an act of symbolic 
politics designed to counter the dissatisfaction of the world’s poorest countries with the 
multilateral system as well as, possibly, a deliberate spur to an overdue effort to overhaul 
the Europe’s own (internal) sugar regime.  Strategic action perhaps, but with apparently 
mixed motives and ambiguous results. 
A third and obvious example of trade policy as foreign policy is the Balkans.  It is 
where the EU has acted most strategically, coherently, and even heroically in foreign 
policy, undertaking several of its most challenging political/military missions (see 
Giegerich and Wallace 2004).  Using trade policy, the Union has (inter alia) abolished 
tariff ceilings for nearly all Balkan products in its Stability and Association agreements 
with states in the region.  It also has offered powerful incentives to encourage regional 
economic cooperation in the Balkans, as well as strong support for the WTO 
memberships of Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and others in the regions.  Lamy boasted 
that the EU’s actions had ‘demonstrate[d] that multilateral and regional policies can and 
do work in reasonable harmony – as well as indicating that in the area of trade policy, the 
EU is ready and willing to act with speed and dexterity’.
18  
Yet, as in the case of EBA, it is not churlish to note devil in the details of the 
EU’s offers of market access in the Balkans.  The designated ‘rules of origin’ in these 
(and other) EU trade agreements often restrict access to Europe’s market to the point 
where they end up being considerably less generous than they appear in headline terms 
(see Panagariya 2002; Brenton and Manchin 2003).  Of course, any disparity between 
intent and impact does not, by itself, lead to the conclusion that EU trade agreements are 
not used for ostensibly political purposes – given their somewhat dubious economic 
effects, we might draw quite the opposite conclusion.
19  But the disparity does cast doubt 
  18on the claim that trade policy is effective as a tool in the service of wider foreign policy 
objectives.   
 
5.  A test case:  effective multilateralism? 
Thus far, we have scoured the EU’s institutional and policy landscape for evidence to 
sustain or debunk the contention that the Union is capable of strategic action:  more 
specifically, that it uses trade policy as an instrument of foreign policy.  Another way to 
test the proposition is to examine a case where the EU has an agreed, stated foreign 
policy goal, and to gauge whether the Union pursues it actively and strategically, 
including, when it can, by resort to its trade policy.    
One testable candidate is the goal of ‘an international order based on effective 
multilateralism’.  It is designated as one of the EU’s (three) ‘strategic objectives’ in the 
2003 European Security Strategy, alongside promoting ‘stability and good governance in 
[the EU’s] immediate neighbourhood’ and confronting ‘threats, new and old’.  While 
never really defining effective multilateralism, the ESS implies that it requires ‘a stronger 
international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based 
international order’.  The classic academic definition of multilateralism is Ruggie’s 
(1992: 571): 
 
Multilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates relations among three 
or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct – that is, 
principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard 
to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may 
exist in any specific occurrence.   
 
Those who advocate multilateralism as a norm ‘consider it necessary to exercise power 
within the framework of rules, the basic point is that they believe in a rule-based system 
not a might-based system’ (Kaldor 2004: 192).   
The importance of trade policy in pursuing effective multilateralism is highlighted 
repeatedly in the ESS.  For example, the WTO appears first on a list of ‘key institutions 
in the international system’ (even before the United Nations) in the Strategy’s section on 
  19‘strengthening the international order’.  The WTO is then singled out (along with the 
International Criminal Court) as an international institution in which the EU has ‘an 
interest in further developing’.  The ESS also underlines the need to strengthen 
international society by enhancing the ‘quality of governments that are its foundation’, 
specifically via a reform agenda that focuses on ‘spreading good governance, dealing 
with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human 
rights’.  In this context, ‘trade’ (and development) ‘policies can be powerful tools in 
promoting reform...conditionality and targeted trade measures should be an important 
element in a European Union security strategy’. 
If our test case is effective multilateralism, we may in effect be investigating a 
more general question that has preoccupied students of Europe’s international role:  does 
the European Union operate a ‘structural foreign policy’ (Keukelaire 2001; 2003; 2004)?  
In other words, does the EU, Brussels-based component of European foreign policy 
consist mostly of international action ‘which aims at influencing in an enduring and 
sustainable way the relatively permanent frameworks within which states relate to each 
other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises or other actors, through the 
influence of the choice of the game as well as the rules of the game’ (Lucarelli 2004: 7)?  
If this formulation seems vague, Teló (2001: 264) may shed light by arguing that the EU 
pursues a structural foreign policy insofar as it seeks to affect: 
 
particularly the economic and social structures of partners (states, regions, 
economic actors, international organizations, etc.), it is implemented through 
pacific and original means (diplomatic relations, agreements, sanctions, and so 
on), and its scope is not conjunctural but rather in the middle and long range. 
 
By this view, what distinguishes a structural foreign policy is, first, its télos:  it seeks to 
shape how foreign partners are ‘structured’, both internally and in terms of how they 
relate to one another (presumably by encouraging them to embrace ‘relatively 
permanent’, EU-style cooperation).  Second, it relies on the distinctive policy tools of a 
civilian power, including (presumably) trade policy.  Third, the timeframe is distinctive:  
operating a structural foreign policy means playing a long, patient game.  A structural 
  20foreign policy is not ‘conjunctural’, or determined by a particular, fleeting state of 
international affairs.  As Nuttall (2005: 110) observes, those who advocate this view 
perceive: 
…a genuine difference between two different kinds of foreign policy, pillar two 
being closer to classic diplomacy while pillar one contain[s] a new type of foreign 
policy, distinctive to the EU and based on longer term, especially economic 
relationships. 
 
  A Europe that meets the demanding standards of a structural foreign policy might 
seem too good to be true.  However, we might recall that one of the classics in the study 
of foreign policy, Arnold Wolfers’ (1965) Discord and Collaboration, argued that all 
states had two kinds of external objectives:  possession goals, which sought some kind of 
material gain such as wealth or territory; and milieu goals, or non-material objectives 
such as stronger international law, universal of human rights, or effective 
multilateralism.
20  The claim that the EU operates a structural foreign policy might, 
effectively, be one about how milieu goals are privileged over possession goals in a way 
that is rare, if not unique, in foreign policy.  Or, it might be part of a larger claim about 
division of labour in European foreign policy, which is by definition a composite policy.  
Specifically: national foreign policies still exist in Europe and they might handle 
possession goals, such as security (assuming that it is a ‘material’ goal), especially as 
expressed via NATO, or the possession goals of ‘classic diplomacy’ via the CFSP.  The 
EU is left, via pillar I, to pursue milieu goals as a civilian power with a structural foreign 
policy (at the risk of overloading one sentence with foreign policy buzzwords).
21
  Here, our investigation of the EU’s contribution to effective multilateralism runs 
into problems.  One is that, put simply, trade policy is more suited to the pursuit of 
possession than milieu goals.  Trade policy (broadly defined) may be and has been used 
at the service of what we might define as structural policy:  the primordial acts of 
European integration, including ‘freeing’ the single market, signing up to the Uruguay 
Round, or even forming the EEC itself, were about trading some degree of short-term 
economic pain, by opening national markets to non-domestic competition, for the long-
term gains that flow from structured economic cooperation, with rules and institutions to 
  21enforce it.  But using trade policy in this way requires a form of enlightened 
statesmanship.  In its absence, trade policy is mostly about is about defending economic 
interests and exploiting competitive advantages. 
    A second problem is that our knowledge of the EU’s contribution to 
multilateralism – ‘effective’ or otherwise – remains primitive.  A major part of the 
problem is that the EU does so much across so many different policy sectors in so many 
institutional configurations that might strengthen (or weaken) multilateralism that 
determining whether or not it is succeeding at achieving this ‘strategic objective’ is 
somewhere between difficult (because of a lack of existing research) to impossible (see 
Peterson et al. 2007).  Moreover, it is unclear – both theoretically and practically – 
whether the EU’s commitment to promoting regionalism beyond Europe is compatible 
with the objective of effective multilateralism, to nod only briefly in the direction of a 
debate that has raged around EU trade policy for years (Bhagwati 1992; Winters 1996; 
Thomas and Magloire 2000; Lamy 2002).   
Here, particularly if we believe that strategic action is motivated by competitive 
dynamics, we might note that in a global ‘market for ideas’ (see McCormick 2006), 
regional cooperation is an idea to which the United States offers only tepid support 
(Smith, K. E. 2003; Beeson 2006b; 2006a), if not outright opposition, in contrast to 
Europe.  Does the EU now tend to embrace any goal that differentiates it from the 
Americans?  A separate but related question arises of whether the Union has also 
embraced effective multilateralism as a goal because it distinguishes it from the great, 
unmentioned, unilateralist, American hegemon.  For their part, many American critics of 
the EU would argue that a multilateral international order obscures, conveniently, the 
EU’s lack of leadership, decisiveness or capacity for proactive foreign policy action.  
Advocates of an EU that uses its trade policy as foreign policy might well view a stronger 
multilateral order as one which, inconveniently, fetters the Union’s ability to use access 
to its market as a level of international power, since it logically subjects trade policy to 
even more and stronger rules.     
Given all the analytical ‘noise’ surrounding our chosen case study, it is perhaps 
revealing that there is no single, obviously most important academic work on the EU’s 
contribution to multilateralism.  Meunier and Nicolaïdis’ (2005; 2006) reflections on the 
  22EU as trade power explores in some depth the questions of whether the Union’s region-
to-region relations with (say) ASEAN or the EuroMed is compatible with multilateralism, 
or whether its neighbourhood policy signals a shift in the direction of state-specific 
agreements, which might be considered the antithesis of multilateralism.  What comes out 
of their work most clearly is that the Union is very much a conflicted trade power, which 
routinely seems to pursue multiple, sometimes mutually incompatible, objectives. 
Meanwhile, Tsoukalis’ (2005: 236) extensive work on EU economic policy, 
always worth careful study, leads him to the blunt conclusion that ‘for many years, the 
EC/EU has been one of the worst, if not the worst, offenders against the principle of 
multilateralism in international trade because of the large number of preferential 
agreements signed with other, mostly developing countries’, even if it has done so 
‘because of old habits and sometimes in an absent-minded fashion’.  Again, much of this 
‘absent-mindedness’ seems to arise from pursuing multiple, incompatible policy 
objectives.  But it also arises from ‘old habits’:  the EU’s commitment to promoting 
regional cooperation has been undermined – most clearly in the case of Mercosur – by 
price support for European agriculture.   
Arguably, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) makes a mockery of the EU’s 
commitment to effective multilateralism more generally.  It is plausible to view the 
Union’s refusal to give sufficient ground on the CAP as the single most important factor 
in the failure of the Doha round of world trade talks to be completed and realize its 
‘development agenda’.  Of course, the EU has multiple policy instruments to advance a 
development agenda.  Yet, in terms of actual impact in the global trading system, the 
EU’s investment in (say) trade facilitation – its policy of giving aid to developing 
countries to become more effective participants in the WTO – is minimal compared to the 
pathologies of the CAP.
22  This picture is sobering if we accept that recent moves such as 
trade facilitation designed to legitimate the WTO, itself universally considered one of the 
most important vestiges of multilateralism, are unlikely to work in the future (see Smythe 
and Smith 2006). 
  Moreover, the suggestion that an enlarged EU might be more prone to strategic 
trade policy action gets little succor from the new politics of CAP reform.  The newest 12 
member states must sit out 10 year transition periods before they become full members of 
  23the CAP, several reforms of which have been proactively delayed until they benefit fully 
from it.  More generally, the new 12 have weak incentives to agree to any reform of the 
CAP before the end of their transition periods, especially as they produce mostly the 
same agricultural products as the EU-15 (Van Den Hoven 2004: 217).  It has long been 
thought that the CAP is likely to turn Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania into agricultural 
protectionists because they will be able to increase their own productive capacity using 
CAP subsidies (Johnson and Rollo 2001).   
More generally, the costs for the new 12 to adopt EU agricultural health and 
safety standards will be high.  For example, it may cost Poland as much as 4-8 per cent of 
its GNP for the next 20 years to implement all EU environmental directives.  The 
question thus arises of whether an effect of enlargement will be the erosion of the 
Union’s position on the ‘precautionary principle’, which has been a lodestone of its trade 
policy for years.
23  Defense of the principle would seem to reflect precisely the sort of 
ethic that a structural foreign policy would seek to embed in the policies of states beyond 
Europe.  However, there appear to be new, practical obstacles to strategic action along 
these lines, as well as moves to advance the cause of effective multilateralism more 
generally, that arise from enlargement.  There also appears to be no shortage of old, 
longstanding obstacles.   
  
Conclusion 
We have considered the argument that trade policy acts as a surrogate for an EU foreign 
policy, as well as the compatible (but more nuanced and optimistic) view that EU trade 
policy serves the wider purposes of a structural foreign policy.  Advocates of both views 
tend to view the Union as having the capacity to engage in strategic action.  The EU’s 
main external policies, and well as the institutions and actors that are purveyors of them, 
have been scrutinized with a view to gauging whether and how often trade policy is 
effectively foreign policy.  We have considered specific cases where the EU appears to 
have used trade policy strategically.  The Union’s aspirations for effective multilateralism 
have been presented as a test case of how trade policy is used, and how effectively, in the 
service of broader foreign policy goals.    
  24We have seen that it is far clearer who speaks for Europe in trade policy than it is 
in foreign policy more generally, and will remain so unless and until the EU gets is 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.  The system of external policy institutions that has grown up 
in Brussels over time has been revealed to be highly compartmentalized with weak 
horizontal links between policy-makers and administrations responsible for specific 
policies.  We have seen that trade policy is a conflicted but still highly atomized and 
rules-bound area, and that even here the EU seems to pursue numerous, not obviously 
compatible objectives. The case of effective multilateralism appears to expose the EU’s 
generally weak capacity for strategic action, or at least its inability to avoid undermining 
such action, although the fairness of this test might be queried.  What cannot be queried is 
that Solana’s recent statement to the European Parliament, during which he was forced to 
deny suggestions that ‘the EU in fact has no common foreign policy’, says something 
rather gloomy about how much the CFSP has developed since it was created 15 years 
ago.
24
Of the alternative views we have considered, the one that claims trade policy acts 
as a surrogate for foreign policy seems easiest to dismiss.  There is little evidence to 
sustain the argument that trade policy is used strategically by the EU to counter US 
hegemony.  Nor is there much to support Messerlin’s (2001) claim that trade policy is an 
instrument of compensation for the Union’s failure to develop the usual accouterments of 
a great power (‘a foreign policy or army’).  The suggestion that the Union uses trade 
policy to ‘pursue milieu goals as a civilian power with a structural foreign policy’ seems 
based on a series of very heroic assumptions about the EU’s capacity for long-term 
thinking and collective action.   
However, the simpler claim that trade policy gives the EU capacity for strategic 
action, at least potentially, is difficult to deny.  In part, this conclusion arises from the 
EU’s recent attempts – such as they are – to think strategically, as reflected in the 
European Security Strategy, the Open Skies agreement, European diplomacy (including 
economic diplomacy) towards Iran, the Balkans, least-developed countries, and so on.  It 
would not be unfair to note that the EU, compared to most other major players in 
international politics, still is not very good at thinking strategically (see European 
Commission 2005: 14-15).  But it is getting better at it.   
  25Ultimately, the analysis in this paper leads us to two conclusions, one empirical 
and one theoretical. The first, empirical conclusion is that EU trade policy seems to be 
used primarily and most often to uphold European economic interests, which may be 
narrow and short-term in nature.  There is little reason to think it is used primarily or very 
often in the service of a broader, vision-inspired, European perspective on how the 
international world should look.  It is worth recalling that trade policy involves the 
application of international law to individual cases in a way that is rare in the practice of 
foreign policy more generally.  Broad visions, principles, and aspirations obviously 
inform trade policy judgments, particularly decisions about whether to litigate or not (see 
Young 2007).  But it would be surprising if those who seek to argue that the EU 
effectively operates a structural foreign policy would be satisfied to argue that the 
Union’s apparent capacity for strategic inaction validates their thesis. 
A second, theoretical conclusion probably should be offered with a dollop of 
humility.  Nevertheless, the early 21
st century has seen the emergence of some accepted 
wisdoms amongst European foreign policy scholars that seem to be both too gallant and 
(mostly) unchallenged.  There is now – as there never been has as clearly before (see 
Peterson 2008) – a single, leading theoretical perspective on European foreign policy, and 
it is social constructivism.
25  We need not go as far as Glarbo (1999: 636) – at least not 
using language as strong as his
26 – in observing that constructivism can seem ‘to be a 
rather vacuous, if not a downright tautological term, that can be adapted to fit almost any 
pre-given theory or empirical phenomenon’.  We should be cautious about suggesting 
that it is particularly dangerous in the hands of European foreign policy specialists since 
‘constructivism supplies dubious and controversially optimistic conclusions’ about how 
effective Europe is as a single, global actor (Glarbo 1999: 638).   
Yet, when we ask whether EU trade policy is used (effectively) as foreign policy, 
whether the Union is capable of strategic action, or if it operates a ‘structural’ policy, the 
answer too often seems to be in the affirmative simply because a European foreign policy 
is under ‘construction’.  Meanwhile, constructivists do not shirk from barbed critiques of 
other theoretical perspectives along the lines of ‘theories of integration usually provide 
monocausal  explanations.   They cannot therefore be considered as general theories but 
rather as ideological models...[that] contribute to shaping the reality of integration rather 
  26than explaning it’ (Bauer and Remacle 2004: 114).  Surely, however, the burden of proof 
falls on those who argue that the EU is more effective, as opposed to simply more active 
in foreign policy, and even more on those who claim that EU trade policy as a tool of 
strategic action in a coherent, effective, ‘structural’ foreign policy.     
 
 
References 
 
Allen, D. (1998). 'Who speaks for Europe?'  The search for an effective and coherent 
external policy. A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?  Competing Visions of 
the CFSP. J. Peterson and H. Sjursen. London and New York, Routledge. 
Baldwin, D. (1985). Economic Statecraft. Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University 
Press. 
Baldwin, M. (2006). 'EU trade politics:  heaven or hell?' Journal of European Public 
Policy 13(6): 922-38. 
Bauer, S. and E. Remacle (2004). Theory and practice of multi-level foreign policy:  the 
European Union's policy in the field of arms export controls. Rethinking 
European Union Foreign Policy. B. Tonra and T. Christiansen. Manchester and 
New York, Manchester University Press. 
Beeson, M. (2006a). Bush and Asia:  America's Evolving Relations with East Asia. 
London and New York, Routledge. 
Beeson, M. (2006b). 'Rethinking regionalism:  Europe and East Asia in comparaitve 
historical perspective.' Journal of European Public Policy 12(6): 969-85. 
Bhagwati, J. N. (1992). Regionalism and multilateralism: an overview. New York, 
Columbia University, Dept of Economics. 
Biscop, S. (2005). The European Security Strategy:  A Global Agenda for Positive 
Power. Aldershot and Burlington, VT, Ashgate. 
Biscop, S. and E. Drieskens (2006). Effective multilateralism and collective security:  
empowering the UN. The European Union at the United Nations. K. V. 
Laatikainen and K. E. Smith. Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave. 
Bolton, J. (2007). 'How Iran probed, found weakness and won a triumph', Financial 
Times, 8 April, (available from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3659540c-e5ed-11db-
9fcf-
000b5df10621,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com
%2Fcms%2Fs%2F3659540c-e5ed-11db-9fcf-
000b5df10621.html&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Fsearch%
3Fsourceid%3Dnavclient; accessed 15 April 2007). 
Brenton, P. and M. Manchin (2003). 'Making EU trade agreements work:  the role of 
rules of origin.' The World Economy 26(5): 755-69. 
Cafruny, A. (2003). The geopolitics of US hegemony in Europe:  from the break-up of 
Yugoslavia to the War in Iraq. A Ruin Fortress?  Neoliberal Hegemony and 
Transformation in Europe. A. Cafruny and M. Ryner. Lanham MD and Oxford, 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
  27Cafruny, A. and M. Ryner, Eds. (2003). A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and 
Transformation in Europe. Oxford and Lanham MD, Rowman & Littlefield. 
CER (2003). The CER guide to the draft EU Constitution. London, Centre for European 
Reform. 
Commission (2002). Communication from the Commission:  a Project for the European 
Union. Brussels, European Commission. 
Cowles, M. G. and S. Curtis (2004). Developments in European integration theory:  the 
EU as 'other'. Developments in the European Union II. M. G. Cowles and D. 
Dinan. Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave. 
Dannreuther, R., Ed. (2004). European Union Foreign and Security Policy:  Towards a 
Neighbourhood Strategy. London and New York, Routledge. 
Dannreuther, R. and J. Peterson, Eds. (2006). Security Strategy and Transatlantic 
Relations. London and New York, Routledge. 
Dassù, M. and A. Missiroli (2002). 'More Europe in foreign and security policy:  the 
institutional dimension of CFSP.' The International Spectator 37(2): 79-88. 
Devuyst, Y. (1995). The European Community and the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round. The State of the European Union Volume III:  Building a European 
Polity? C. Rhodes and S. Mazey. Boulder and Essex, Lynne Rienner and 
Longman. 
Egeberg, M. (2005). 'EU institutions and the transformation of European-level politics:  
how to understand profound change (if it occurs).' Comparative Euorpean Politics 
3(1): 102-117. 
Elliott, K. A., et al. (1990). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Washington DC, Peterson 
Institute. 
European Commission (2005). Review of the Framework for Relations between the 
European Union and the United States:  an Independent Study. Brussels, DG 
External Relations. 
Gallezot, J. and J.-C. Bureau (2005). The trade effects of the EU's Everything But Arms 
initiative. Brussels, Commission of the European Union - Directorate General for 
Trade. 
Giegerich, B. and W. Wallace (2004). 'Not such a soft power:  the external deployment of 
European forces.' Survival 46(2): 163-82. 
Gillespie, R. and R. Youngs, Eds. (2002). European Union Democracy Promotion:  the 
case of North Africa. London, Frank Cass. 
Glarbo, K. (1999). 'Wide-awake diplomacy:  reconstructing the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy of the European Union.' Journal of European Public Policy 6(4): 
634-51. 
Glarbo, K. (2001). Reconstructing a Common European Foreign Policy. The Social 
Construction of Europe. T. Christiansen, K. E. Jorgensen and A. Weiner. London 
and Thousand Oaks CA, Sage. 
Haas, R. N. and M. L. O'Sullivan, Eds. (2000). Honey and Vinegar:  Incentives, 
Sanctions, and Foreign Policies. Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. 
Heisbourg, F. (2004). The "European Security Strategy" is not a security strategy. A 
European Way of War. S. Evertset al. London, Centre for European Reform. 
Hill, C. (2003). The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. Basingstoke and New York, 
Palgrave. 
  28Hill, C. (2004). 'Rationalizing or regrouping?  EU foreign policy since 11 September 
2001.' Journal of Common Market Studies 42(1): 143-63. 
Howorth, J. (2001). 'European defence and the changing politics of the European Union:  
hanging together or hanging separately?' Journal of Common Market Studies 
39(4): 765-89. 
Johnson, M. and J. Rollo (2001). 'EU enlargement and the making of commercial policy.' 
Sussex European Institute Working Paper 43(March). 
Kagan, R. (2003). Of Paradise and Power:  America and Europe in the New World Order. 
New York, Knopf. 
Kaldor, M. (2004). American Power:  From "Compellance" to Cosmopolitanism? 
American Power in the 21st Century. D. Held and M. Koenig-Archibugi. 
Cambridge and Malden MA, Polity. 
Keohane, R. O. (2000). 'Ideas part-way down.' Review of International Studies 26(1): 
125-30. 
Keukelaire, S. (2001). Au-dela de la PESC.  La politique étrangère structurelle de 'Union 
européenne. Annuaire français de Relations internationales. Brussels, Bruylant: 
536-51. 
Keukelaire, S. (2003). 'The European Union as a diplomatic actor:  internal, traditional 
and structural diplomacy.' Diplomacy and Statecraft 14(3): 31-56. 
Keukelaire, S. (2004). EU structural policy and structural conflict prevention. The 
European Union and Conflict Prevention:  Legal and Policy Aspects. V. 
Kronenberger and J. Wouters. The Hague, T.M.C, Asser Press. 
Lamy, P. (2002). 'Stepping Stones or Stumbling Blocks?  The EU's Approach Towards 
the Problem of Multilateralism vs. Regionalism in Trade Policy.' The World 
Economy 25(10): 1399-1413. 
Lewis, J. (2000). 'The methods of Community in EU decision-making and administrative 
rivalry in the Council's General Secretariat.' Journal of European Public Policy 
7(2): 261-89. 
Lucarelli, S. (2004 of Conference). 'EU foreign policy between telos and identity.' 
European Consortium for Political Research second pan-European conference, 
Bologna. 
Ludlow, P. (1992). Europe's institutions, Europe's politics. The Shape of the New Europe. 
G. F. Treverton. New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press. 
Manners, I. (2002). 'Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?' Journal of 
Common Market Studies 40(2): 235-58. 
Manners, I. (2006). 'Normative power Europe reconsidered.' Journal of European Public 
Policy 13(2): 182-99. 
McCormick, J. (2006). The European Superpower. Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave. 
Messerlin, P. (2001). Measuring the costs of economic protection in Europe. Washington 
DC, Institute for International Economics. 
Meunier, S. (2005). Trading voices: the European Union in international commercial 
negotiations. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. 
Meunier, S. and K. Nicolaïdis (1999). 'Who speaks for Europe?  The delegation of trade 
authority in the EU.' Journal of Common Market Studies 37(3): 477-501. 
  29Meunier, S. and K. Nicolaïdis (2005). The European Union as a Trade Power. 
International Relations and the European Union. C. Hill and M. Smith. Oxford 
and New York, Oxford University Press. 
Meunier, S. and K. Nicolaïdis (2006). 'The European Union as a Conflicted Trade 
Power.' Journal of European Public Policy 13(6): 906-25. 
Nuttall, S. (2005). Coherence and consistency. International Relations and the European 
Union. C. Hill and M. Smith. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press. 
Obie, J. (2006). 'Civilian power in Europe:  review of the original and current debates.' 
Conflict and Cooperation 41(1): 123-8. 
Page, S. and A. Hewitt (2002). 'The new European trade preferences:  does "everything 
but arms" (EBA) help the poor?' Development Policy Review 20(1): 91-102. 
Panagariya, A. (2002). 'EU prefential trade arrangements and developing countries.' The 
World Economy 25(10): 1415-32. 
Petersmann, E.-U. (2001). Dispute prevention and dispute settlement in the EU-US 
transatlantic partnership. Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy. M. A. 
Pollack and G. C. Shaffer. Oxford and Lanham MD, Rowman and Littlefield. 
Peterson, J. (2006). The College of Commissioners. The Institutions of the European 
Union. J. Peterson and M. Shackleton. Oxford and New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
Peterson, J. (2008). The EU as a global actor. The European Union:  How Does it Work? 
E. Bomberg and A. Stubb. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press. 
Peterson, J., et al. (2007). The Consequences of Europe:  Multilateralism and the New 
Security Agenda, University of Edinburgh. 
Peterson, J. and E. Bomberg (1999). Decision-making in the European Union. 
Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave. 
Pollack, M. A. and G. C. Shaffer (2001). Transatlantic Governance in Historical and 
Theoretical Perspective. Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy. M. A. 
Pollack and G. C. Shaffer. Oxford and Lanham MD, Rowman and Littlefield. 
Ruggie, J. G. (1992). 'Multilateralism:  the anatomy of an institution.' International 
Organization 46(3): 561-98. 
Sauer, T. (2007). Coercive diplomacy by the EU:  the case of Iran. The Hague, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ('Clingendael'). 
Smith, K. E. (2003). European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Oxford and 
New York, Polity. 
Smith, M. (1998). Does the Flag Follow Trade?  "Politicisation" and the Emergence of a 
European Foreign Policy. A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?  Competing 
Visions of the CFSP. J. Peterson and H. Sjursen. London and New York, 
Routledge. 
Smith, M. (2004). Foreign economic policy. Contemporary European Foreign Policy. W. 
Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White. London and Thousand Oaks CA, Sage. 
Smith, M. E. (2001). The quest for coherence:  institutional dilemmas of external action 
from Maastricht to Amsterdam. The Institutionalisation of Europe. A. Stone 
Sweet, W. Sandholtz and N. Fligstein. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Smith, M. E. (2003). Europe's Foreign and Security Policy. Cambridge and New York, 
Cambridge University Press. 
  30Smith, M. E. (2004). 'Institutionalization, policy adaptation and European foreign policy 
cooperation.' European Journal of International Relations 10(1): 95-136. 
Smith, M. E., B. Crowe and J. Peterson (2007). ‘International interests: the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy’, in J. Peterson and M. Shackleton (eds).The 
Institutions of the European Union. Oxford and New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
Smythe, E. and P. J. Smith (2006). 'Legitimacy, transparency, and information 
technology:  the World Trade Organization in an era of contentious trade politics.' 
Global Governance 12(1): 31-53. 
Telo, M., Ed. (2001). European Union and the New Regionalism. Aldershot and 
Burlington, VT, Ashgate. 
Thomas, C. R. and J. T. Magloire (2000). Regionalism versus multilateralism: the 
Organization of American States in a global changing environment. Boston, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Tsoukalis, L. (2005). ‘Managing Interdependence:  the EU in the World Economy’. in C. 
Hill and M. Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union. Oxford 
and New York, Oxford University Press. 
Van Den Hoven, A. (2004). The European Union as an international economic actor. In 
N. Nugent (ed) European Union Enlargement. Basingstoke and New York, 
Palgrave. 
Whitman, R. G. (1998). From Civilian Power to Superpower?  The International Identity 
of the European Union. Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave. 
Winters, L. A. (1996). Regionalism versus multilateralism. London, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research. 
Wolfers, A. (1965). Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Young, A. R. (2007). ‘When to prosecute trade disputes?  The European Union's 
initiation of WTO complaints’, mimeo, University of Glasgow. 
Young, A. R. and J. Peterson, Eds. (2007). The New Politics of European Union Trade. 
London and New York, Routledge. 
Youngs, R. (2004). Europe's Uncertain Pursuit of Middle East Reform. Washington DC, 
Canegie Endowment for International Peace. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Just one illustrative example of how the EU’s most forthright and caustic critics are often Americans:  the 
former US Undersecretary for Arms Control in the Bush administration’s Pentagon (and proposed, but 
rejected, US Ambassador to the United Nations), John Bolton (2007), asserted that during the crisis that 
followed Iran’s seizure of British marines and sailors near the Iraq border, ‘the European Union contributed 
their usual level of determination:  precious little’.  The classic American statement on the EU’s 
international weakness is now, of course, (Kagan 2003). 
2 See for example the review of Messerlin’s study by Robert Feenstra in World Trade Review, 1 (2): 228-
30.  Feenstra notes that Messerlin’s study calculates the costs of protection to European consumers without 
allowing for offsetting benefits to European firms or governments (through increased revenues from 
tariffs), an approach that Feenstra describes as ‘unconventional’ (p.229). 
3 This quote and previous one from the Commission staff working document, Annex to the 
  31                                                                                                                                                 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Global Europe: Competing in the World - a 
Contribution to the EU's Growth and Jobs Strategy, SEC(2006) EN 1230, Brussels, 4 October 2006, p.16. 
4 The full text of the ESS is available at http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf and as an appendix in 
Dannreuther and Peterson (2006).   
5 This point was impressed upon me sometime in the distant past by Alan Dashwood, one of the top 
European lawyers of his generation.  It is also prominently highlighted by Messerlin (2001: 6-7). 
6 See Andrew Beatty, ‘Kypriano seeks to end ban on Polish meat’, European Voice, 11 January 2007,  
available at:  http://www.europeanvoice.com/archive/article.asp?id=27067; Euractiuv.com, ‘EU-25 backs 
Poland in beef row with Russia’, 18 December 2006, available at:  
http://www.europeanvoice.com/archive/article.asp?id=27067; (both accessed 23 April 2007). 
7 Personal correspondence with official in DG Trade, 28 March 2007.   
8 To illustrate the point, QMV was a major discussion point in a recent interview with Tony Blair on the 
fate of the Constitutional Treaty.  See Dana Spinant, ‘Blair to clinch deal on Constitution before quitting’, 
European Voice, 19 April 2007, available at:  http://www.europeanvoice.com/current/article.asp?id=27890 
(accessed 23 April 2007).   
9 ‘The Convention and trade policy:  concrete steps to enhance the EU’s international profile’, speech 
delivered in Brussels, 5 February 2003 (available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/lamy/speeches_articles/spla146_en.htm; accessed 15 
April 2007).  See also ‘What Europe for this world?’, speech delivered to the Grandes Conférences 
Catholiques, Brussels, 24 March 2003 ( available from:  
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/lamy/speeches_articles/spla163_en.htm; accessed 15 
April 2007) and various other of Lamy’s 2003 speeches available at:    
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/lamy/speeches_articles/indexpldat_en.htm#2003.   
10 ‘The Convention and trade policy’ (see note 10). 
11 See Euractiv.com, ‘EU tops world anti-dumping charts’, 11 April 2007, available at: 
http://euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-tops-world-anti-dumping-charts/article-163079 (accessed 23 April 2007). 
12 Changes in voting rules governing anti-dumping (making it easier to launch investigations) were agreed 
as the price of France’s support for the Uruguay Round agreement in the early 1990s make it more difficult 
for the Commission to ‘gatekeep’ in this area.    
13 Personal correspondence with DG Trade official, 28 March 2007. 
14 Interview, US Mission to the European Union, 5 July 2006. 
15 For a view that closely reflects that of the Bush administration, see the leading article (‘op ed’) entitled 
‘Tehran’s triumph:  Europe and the UN bless Iran’s march towards nuclear weapons’, Wall Street Journal, 
1 December 2004 (available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005965; 
accessed 21 April 2007).   
16 See for example Steven Mufson, ‘US cautions Europeans to avoid oil, gas deals with Iran’, Washington 
Post, 1 February 2007, p.A12; Steven R. Weisman, ‘EU agrees to widen economic sanctions against Iran’, 
International Herald Tribune, 12 February 2007, available from:  
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/13/africa/web.0213sanctions.php (accessed 17 April 2007).   
17 Details at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_131985.pdf (accessed 21 April 
2007). 
18 See Lamy’s speech ‘Europe in the international economic system’ to the Hellenic Foundation for 
European and Foreign Policy, 3 October 2002, available at:  http://www.eliamep.gr/eliamep/files/lnb_2002-
10-03.pdf (accessed 18 April 2007). 
19 Messerlin (2001: 4) goes as far as to claim that ‘all these agreements have had almost no economic 
impact on the E[U]’.   
20 There are, of course, problems with all such sharp dichotomies in the social sciences, including this one:  
is security, for example, a material or non-material goal (Keohane 2000)? 
21 In fact, Manners (2006) argues (somewhat reluctantly) that the EU is capable of this tricky balancing act.  
It can remain what he calls a ‘normative power’ so long as its military ambitions do not take it beyond the 
crossroads specified in the European Security Strategy, which prescribes meeting new security threats with 
a ‘mixture of instruments’ including military ones and (for example) using military force to ‘restore 
order…in failed states’.  The problem is that Manners sees the EU as ‘militarizing’ beyond the limits set for 
itself in the ESS. 
  32                                                                                                                                                 
22 For a complete (at the time) list of all EU trade facilitation activities, see WTO Negotiating Group on 
Trade Facilitation, ‘Communication from the European Communities:  Technical Assistance and Support 
for Capacity Building’, TN/TF/W/37, 29 April 2005 (available from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/may/tradoc_123447.pdf; accessed 17 April 2007).   
23 The precautionary principle is not defined in the Treaty or any other EU instrument and is mentioned 
only once in the (EC) Treaty’s title on environmental policy.  The European Environment Agency’s web-
site (http://glossary.eea.europa.eu/EEAGlossary/P/precautionary_principle; accessed 17 April 2007) 
defines it as the ‘(1) Principle adopted by the UN Conference on the Environment and Development (1992) 
that in order to protect the environment, a precautionary approach should be widely applied, meaning that 
where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage to the environment, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation. (2) The precautionary principle permits a lower level of proof of harm to be used in policy-
making whenever the consequences of waiting for higher levels of proof may be very costly and/or 
irreversible’. 
24 See ‘Solana:  “CFSP must be compatible with EU strategy”’, Euractiv.com, 30 March 2007, available at: 
http://euractiv.com/en/security/solana-cfsp-compatible-eu-strategy/article-162907 (accessed 10 May 2007). 
25 Note that there is good evidence to suggest that constructivism is not the leading theory of the rest of 
what the EU does; that mantle has been earned by institutionalism (Cowles and Curtis 2004). 
26 Glarbo (2001: 636) is actually far more sympathetic to constructivism than it appears from the selected 
quotations offered here, and in fact seeks to develop ‘a truly theoretical constructivism’ in the article cited 
(Glarbo 2001). 
  33